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GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND WELFARE EMPLOYMENT
Martin D. Lowenthal
Boston College
ABSTRACT
One of the persistent issues which welfare policy makers and
analysts confront in western industrial nations, particularly in the
United States, is the appropriate relationship between public assistance
payments and employment. There is a great deal of debate over whether
welfare recipients should work or be required to take jobs and whether
the government should emphasize training or placement services or create
jobs directly. Relatively little concern and attention have been given
to the 'roblem of the number of jobs that are actually available in the
private sector for recipients who want to work.
Although the federal government will plan its spending levels with
an eye to the impacts on the employment situation in the country, there
has been little effort to examine how various types of spending affect
the employment prospects of specific population groups. This paper
makes an initial attempt to analyze the differential employment impacts
of various kinds of federal spending as they affect the population on
welfare. Based on research on the employment characteristics of recip-
ients population and the application of an input-output model developed
by the Department of Labor, estimates of increased welfare employment
are derived for increases in particular types of federal spending.
I. Evolution of AFDC Employment Strategies
When Aid to Dependent Children was established in 1935 it was
designed to benefit children of families who were effectively outside
the labor force. Until 1962 the federal government showed little
interest in efforts to increase the labor force activity of AFDC
recipients. In 1961 Congress extended AFDC to offer to states the option
of including unemployed parents (UP), thus bringing employable males
into the program for the first time.
*The research for this paper was completed with the assistance of
Adriana Stadecker and Hugh Wilkins. The research was supported by a grant
from the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Grant No. SRS
18-P-9033211-01.
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These new clients were expected to be looking for work as a condition
of their eligibility. To assist them Congress established in 1962 the
Comuity Work and Training Program. This program was expanded into the
Work Experience and Training Program by the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964. Under Title V of that Act, grants were given to state and local
welfare agencies to pay the costs of "demonstration" projects so that
the states could establish work experience projects. The expanded funds
allotted to this effort and the broadening of the base of eligibility
reflected the doubt that low national unemployment rates could assure a
job for everyone who wanted to work. It was clear that, even with
declining unemployment in the 1960's, certain groups continued to
experience considerable joblessness. The idea behind these programs was
to reach out and help persons who could not "compete" in the labor market
changing their characteristics in such a way that "structural" barriers
to employment would be removed.
The challenge of these early programs was to provide useful training
and work to participants. Although there was some vocational instruction
that accompanied some of the work assignments, the bulk of the assign-
ments was limited to low-paying, unskilled occupations. The overall
impact of WET in reducing dependency through its mix of rehabilitation,
training and experience was small. According to one survey, three of
every four trainees left the program without completing their assign-
ments, with only one-fifth of those leaving to take a job. Half of the
trainees who left through graduation or dropping out continued on public
assistance and only 17% were employed. There was little evidence that
the employability of participants improved or that caseload and expendi-
ture rates of public assistance were reduced, since the average family
with an employable father tended to remain on assistance for less than a
year and thus most would have found employment even without the program
in the tight labor market that prevailed throughout the years of the WET
program.
In 1967 this program was converted into the Work Incentive Program
(WIN). WIN was a much broader attempt to put AFDC recipients to work, and
it included mothers for the first time. One purpose of WIN was to reduce
the growth in the AFDC caseload by putting certain groups of recipients
into the labor force. Since most AFDC recipients are mothers, the focus
of the program was shifted radically. While earlier manpower programs
had led to an increased understanding of the labor market behavior and
problem@ of the "hard-core" unemployed males, relatively little was known
about the labor market behavior of female heads of households with chil-
dren.
To equip potentially employable persons to get and hold a job, WIN
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was supposed to combine social services, child care services and manpower
training services, including on-the-job training, institutional training,
work experience and counseling. In addition to provision of services,
other incentives were developed. A $30 a month training stipend was
provided, along with transportation and other out-of-pocket expenses.
The "income disregard" was also developed. This allowed AFDC recipients
who became employed to retain the first $30 of their family income, and
30% of all income beyond the first $30 without reduction in the welfare
payment.
Conceptually, WIN expanded and modified the earlier programs. It
concentrated the bulk of its effort on the behavioral characteristics
of clients themselves by providing incentives for labor force participa-
tion, participation priorities for unemployed fathers, training, and
services which would assist family functioning in a way which permitted
labor force activity. In the context of continual decline in the unem-
ployment rates, an optimistic view of the demand for workers prevailed
and little emphasis was given to job development and placement activities.
A kind of faith existed among the program planners that if the employ-
ability of the supply of workers who were on welfare could be enhanced
then the job search and job opportunities would generally sort themselves
out.
In the WIN Longitudinal Study which covered a period between 1969 and
1971, AUERBACH Associates found that the post WIN employment behavior of
WIN enrollees was nearly unaffected by participation in the program. WIN
did not appear to have a significant impact on the ability of the enroll-
ees to obtain a job with 37% finding employment before termination in the
program and 50% of those obtaining employment through their own efforts
and not as a result of program placement efforts. The study found that
less than 23% of clients participating in the program were actually sent
to job interviews. The WIN experience produced only small gains in the
earning capacity.
As a result of the Talmadge Amendments in December 1971, several
modifications were made in the WIN program. The primary goal of these
changes was to move more people through the WIN system at a faster rate.
The major changes were: 1) mandatory registration of all employable
AFDC recipients whose presence in the home is not required; 2) a shift in
emphasis from training to direct job placement and on-the-job training;
3) improved administrator and client evaluation. Direct job placement in
public service employment continued to be subsidized with WIN monies. In
addition, a provision of the Revenue Act of 1971 provided a tax credit
to employers who hired WIN participants.
The modifications in the program represented a change in the
orientation of the program from one which emphasized the improved
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employability of workers to one which concentrated on the process by
which the worker and job are matched. This newer approach gave little
attention to changing the human capital characteristics of the client
population and generally assimed that demand for these workers existed.
The inclusion of the tax credit was the beginning of a recognition that
the program might need to intervene in some respect to make more job
opportunities available to its target population but the thrust remained
on procedures for ensuring client job search and placement services.
In January 1973, 33% of all families on AFDC in areas with WIN
projacts had family members registered. Of the 855,000 AFDC family
members registered, only 48% were actually certified for job training or
placement, and of these 30% were actively in job training or placement.
Out of 2,967,000 adults receiving AFDC, less than 5% were receiving job
training or placement assistance during the month.
Simple program statistics reveal some broad dimensions about the
functioning of the program. According to NCSS data less than 12% of the
people who were registered for WIN in fiscal 1974 obtained non-public
service jobs and in 1973 the figure was less than 10%. From the data it
is impossible to determine whether these were placements resulting from
program activities or from self-placement; however, if previous ratios
from WIN I or other programs apply in this case, something in the
neighborhood of 50% self-placements, the effectiveness of the WIN III
approach appears even less impressive. In terms of de-registrations
owing to employment, only 8% had completed the job entry period and were
able to leave welfare during fiscal 1975.
The Revenue Act of 1971 established a tax credit for employers hiring
AFDC recipients who were registered in the Work Incentive Program. In
1975, the credit was expanded to cover all AFDC recipients for a trial
of 15 months. This is the closest that the federal government has come
to stimulating the demand for workers on welfare.
II. Creating Jobs for Welfare Recipients
The research and theoretical work that has been done on demand
stimulation has tended to focus on national macro levels of analysis and
has not given attention to policies which are directed at specific low
income populations such as those on welfare.
A. Macro Neoclassical Theory
The concern of macro economists since the depression has been the
recurrence of cycles of depression and prosperity in the national economy.
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Prosperous periods are marked by rising production, relatively high
rates of profit, relatively high wages, high prices, and comparatively
high levels of employment. Depression periods are characterized by low
wages, actual declines in production, and high unemployment rates.
These phenomena tend to have a recurrent pattern and have been called
"business cycles". Although the content of the cycle - the repetition of
expansion and contraction - is regular, the duration of the phases and
their apparent causes are less predictable and clear.
The Federal government has generally initiated demand stimulation
policies after the "peak" of the business cycle, during the contraction
phase. When recovery occurs, many of the macro-policies aimed at stimu-
lating production are reduced or eliminated. If these policies were
maintained, it is generally felt that an inflationary process would be
set in motion. Much of the debate among economic policy analysts and
advisors centers around the trade-off between rates of unemployment and
inflation. It is generally believed that full employment is limited by
the inflationary pressures which arise in the economy from excessive
demand for goods and services. The most popular description of the
trade-off is represented by the Phillips curve. This curve, E = PN
(where E is money expenditures, P is the level of prices and N are the
units of employment or output), plots the relationship between unemploy-
ment rates and prices. When unemployment rates fall, prices are
expected to rise.
The macro-economic policies which are used in the attempt to
regulate the rates of employment and inflation tend to be employed on a
sporadic basis and to be directed at aggregate phenomena which may hide
the dynamics of what is happening for those populations which tend to be
on welfare. The fiscal and monetary policies which are used affect
various industries in different ways. In some highly capitalized and
unionized sectors of the economy, the stability of employment and the
rate of employment could be at a level where expansion would tend to
aggravate inflation, while, in more labor intensive and less organized
sectors, expansionary policies would simply tap underutilized labor
capacity and not lead to inflationary pressures. Economic research and
theory is currently examining the nature of the institutions which divide
economic sectors and the various segments of the labor force. This work
suggests that there are differential effects of macro policies aimed at
economic recovery and that those sectors in which welfare populations
tend to be employed are generally the slowest to respond and experience
recovery.
Concern for these sectors and specific groups within the labor force
has led to the development of segmentation theory. Segmentation theory
focuses on particular areas of the economy which tend to have very
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strong effects on welfare expenditures and it directs attention to the
wide range of institutions which affect the distributional effects of
demand stimulation policies.
B. Labor Market Segmentation Theory
The basic hypothesis of the labor market segmentation theory,
is that the labor market is divided into essentially distinct sectors
or segments and that welfare recipients are generally restricted to
employment in a limited number of occupations or industries - segments.
Their jobs are characterized by low wages, poor working conditions,
little chance for advancement, and instability. Some segments of this
labor pool face cyclical unemployment, others present high rates of
turnover. These theories provide useful insight into the dynamics of
the w lfare population and welfare expenditures.
The starting point for the segmentation theory of jobs is that
within the whole economy jobs may be more or less clearly grouped into
those jobs having more stability, higher paying and better work condi-
tions. The latter can also be characterized by high turnover rates.
The high turnover rates are due to several factors. The industry may be
subject to seasonal or business cycle fluctuations in demand. It may
also be suffering from a long term decline, as, for example, in the New
England textile industry.
Another aspect of high turnover rates is often voluntary quits by
the employee or firings by the employer, this results from several
factors and dimensions of the job situation. These jobs usually require
very little skill or training; they do not offer opportunities for
advancement; and they provide few non-wage benefits. Relationships
between the employee and employer are not governed by any formal indus-
trial relations system, union or otherwise. Associated with these
high turnover jobs is a large group of unemployed workers who cycle in
and out of jobs. The unemployed population on welfare is one of these
groups.
The "better" jobs have been called "primary" while the "poorer" ones
are often called "secondary". This segmentation is not simply based on a
rank ordering of jobs according to their desirability, but rather on the
posited existence of barriers between the segments. Those barriers may
restrict entrance to primary sector jobs, as, for example, restrictive
labor union membership. Or the barriers may be job characteristics which
prevent a worker from improving his skills to qualify for a better job.
This framework has been developed from the research of several
segmented labor market theorists, notably Doeringer, Piore and Bluestone.
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It allows us to focus on several related aspects of jobs as they affect
family income. More importantly, it focuses attention on the relationship
between job characteristics, worker characteristics, and institutional
factors which structure the flow of workers to jobs.
Since the early development of markets for labor in the early
nineteenth century, institutions have played a large role in controlling
the allocations of labor, conditions of work, and wage levels. The
institutions which structure labor markets and sectors in the economy
reveal the political issues involved in changing labor market behavior
and the factors and interests associated with particular institutional
arrangements. Four groups of institutional factors in the labor market
are the subject of particular concern in this project. They are
employees, employers, intermediates, and government.
a. Employee Institutions. The major institutions of employees are,
of course, labor and trade unions. While less than thirty
percent of the American work force is organized by unions, the
wage and benefit levels and work standards affect a much larger
proportion of workers. This effect occurs directly through
raising the wage expectations of non-union workers, and in-
directly through raising the cost of living.
b. Employer Institutions. Many corporations constitute large
scale institutions with complex organizations and sub-structures.
Within an individual firm the internal labor market is an
institution which affects a very large proportion of the American
work force.
The internal labor market is represented by an organizational
unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which wages and
distribution of labor are governed by a set of administrative
rules and procedures. It is connected with the external labor
market through jobs which are called ports of entry. The rest
of the jobs in the internal labor market are filled through
promotion and transfer. To the degree that these labor
allocation rules are rigid, they shield these jobs from the
direct competitive influence of the external labor market,
There are two types of internal labor markets: enterprise
markets, which are found in most manufacturing establishments;
and union-centered craft markets, which are found in the building
trades, longshoring, and certain services. The development of an
internal labor market is accompanied by an increase in the
stability of employment for its workers.
c. Intermediate Institutions. Between the worker searching for
new employment and the employer seeking to fill a job slot are
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a variety of systems, both formal and informal. These include
the Public Employment Service, private employment agencies,
temporary manpower firms, newspaper advertising, schools, and
neighborhood channels of information. Various groups in the
labor force will have access to only certain intermediate
systems and the use of these systems by employers will depend
upon the type of employee that is desired. This tends to
further reinforce job structures and patterns which already
exist.
d. Government Institutions. The two institutions which most
directly affect the labor market behavior of the welfare
population are the welfare system and the manpower and place-
ment programs of the Public Employment Service. The welfare
system influences work behavior through its benefit levels,
definitions of employability, "welfare tax" rates, require-
ments for work, and tax incentives to employers.
Government also affects the structure of labor markets through
various legislative acts and the respective government agencies
charged with regulation and enforcement. There are several
acts which affect industrial labor relations directly, such as
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner Act of 1935,
as well as a much larger body of legislation which regulate
production processes and work conditions.
Institutional variables influence both the direct and indirect
effects on labor market behavior. In the segmented model, the primary
sectors are more highly institutionalized while the secondary sectors
appear to have relatively little institutionalization. While the
secondary sector includes most welfare recipients in terms of employment,
the functioning of that sector is strongly influenced by the actions of
firms and employees in the primary sector.
In addition to the segmentation of the labor force, some economists
have also examined the segmentation of industries and found that the
characteristics of the industries has important effects of labor market
functioning and the effects of labor demand stimulation policies. One
such theory, notably expressed by Averitt,1 divides firms into basically
two types - the center and the peripheral. The organizations of the
center firms "are corporate and bureaucratic; its production processes
are vertically integrated through ownership and control of critical raw
material suppliers and product distributors; its activities are diversi-
fied into many industries, regions and nations. Financial support is
1. Robert I. Averitt, The Dual Economy, W. W. Norton Company, 1968.
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readily available from both internal and external sources. Firms in the
- large economy serve national and international markets, using technologi-
cally progressive systems of production and distribution. The affairs
of such enterprise are conducted with a view to survival in perpetuity
as they meet economic crises with successive strategies of firm expan-
sion". 2
The small peripheral firms "are the ones usually dominated by a
single individual or family. The firms' sales are realized in restricted
markets. Profits and retained earnings are commonly below those of the
center; long-term borrowing is difficult. Economic crises often result
in bankruptcy or severe financial retrenchment. Techniques of production
and marketing are rarely as up to date as those in the center. These
firms are often, though not always technological followers, sometimes
trailing at some distance behind industry leaders." 3
III. Government Spending and Procurement
The federal budget today is a major segment of the economy, and
its impact on the economy in general and on particular labor markets is
enormous. In 1976 total direct Federal spending exceeded 22 percent of
the gross national product and Federal purchases were approximately 8
percent of the GNP. Although it is clear that these expenditures have a
significant impact on most sectors and activities of the economy, the
literature in economics contains relatively little information on the
employment effects of government expenditures by industry, occupation,
region, or labor force group. Most studies confine themselves to
studying the impact of overall fiscal (spending) policy on the total
unemployment rate.
There appear to be strong linkages between the segmentation of jobs
and the segmentation of industries but they are by no means simple.
Firms in a primary or center industry may have certain sets of jobs that
have most of the characteristics of secondary jobs. Firms in the second-
ary or peripheral economy will have certain jobs, certainly at the
managerial level, which fit the characteristics of "good" jobs. The same
production level job may appear in both primary and secondary industries,
probably offering higher pay in the primary industry. This paper examines
the impact of government spending policies on both industries and
occupations.
The use of federal spending as a tool of macro economic stimulus is
well accepted. The impact of this spending on local economies is also
2. Ibid, p. 12
3. Ibid, p. 12
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recognized and this fact figures into the political strategies of
congressional representatives in attempting to serve the interests of
their local constituencies. Various industries and interest groups also
take great interest and attempt to exert influence over the patterns and
priorities contained within the federal budget.
However, within the enormous literature on the federal budget,
little attention has been given to the differential affects of various
federal spending programs on the employment of workers on welfare except
where such programs are specifically designed to affect that population,
such as WIN, CETA, and some supported work and public service employ-
ment programs. What follows is an estimation of the job creation
potential for welfare recipients of various spending catagories. This
is only an initial, somewhat crude attempt, but it does reveal many
differences between categories which should be considered in developing
and assessing the federal budget as a stimulus for employment.
Probably the most important publication on the subject has been
developed by the Department of Labor, the Factbook for Estimating the
Manpower Needs of Federal Programs. 4 This publication provides detailed
estimates of the impacts of different types of government spending
programs by industry and occupation. These estimates have been used to
develop more detailed estimates of the impact by industry and occupation
of different approaches to increasing employment for workers on welfare
through government spending.
In this section, the following breakdown of federal spending is
made:
1. Defense
2. Non-Defense
3. Education
4. Health and Welfare
5. Tax Expenditures for Individual Consumption
6. Tax Expenditures for Corporate Investment
7. Public Sector (Overall)
8. Private Sector (Overall)
It should be noted that what Stanley Surrey called "tax expendi-
tures" are considered to be a part of federal spending in the economy.
Tax expenditures simply represent revenues which are not collected so
that they can be used in private ways which have been decided by the
government as being socially, economically, and/or politically desirable.
4 - U. S. Department of Labor, Factbook for Estimating the Manpower Needs
of Federal programs. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1832, 1975.
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If the government wishes to increase the industrial capital capacity of
the economy, investment tax credits are utilized to encourage firms to
spend money on capital investment by being able to retain earnings which
would normally go to the government to pay for other programs.
The question that is asked is how many jobs for welfare workers
are created by spending a billion dollars in the ways indicated above.
In order to answer this question, the estimates of manpower require-
ments for federal spending that were developed for the Department of
Labor in 1972 was used and the employment experiences of welfare
recipients by industry and occupation were obtained from the 1975
Current Population Survey.
The procedure used was the following:
a. Ratios were computed for the number of welfare recipients
who had employment experience in each industry and
occupation as a part of the total labor force in that
industry and occupation.
b. These ratios were then multiplied by the manpower estimates
developed by the Department of Labor by industry and
occupation for each category of federal spending. The
Department of Labor designation of personal consumption
was used as being roughly equivalent to a tax expenditure
for personal consumption (such as income tax credit) and
the designation of private fixed investment was used for
tax expenditures for private investments (such as the
investment tax credit).
c. The resulting welfare employment figures were then
aggregated and then adjusted for 1976 price levels by
multiplying the total by .34 which was computed from the
Gross National Product Implicit Deflator.
The resulting figures by industry and by occupation differ
somewhat in terms of welfare employment. The reasons for this derive
from two factors; the first is that the occupations contain figures
which include only civilian employment where the industry estimates
include non-civilians and secondly, the federal spending by industry
affects occupations differentially and welfare recipients tend to be
concentrated in those occupations which are somewhat less impacted.
Because we are concerned about civilian employment, the discussion uses
primarily the estimates derived by occupation. The figures by industry
are included later. It should be noted that these estimates are only
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the direct manpower effects and do not reflect the employment that
results from multiplier aspects of spending. In all probability much
of the employment of those on welfare would be realized in these
multiplier impacts because personal, private household, and many other
service areas where recipients tend to be employed are not included in
the input-output model of direct employment that these figures are
based upon.
The results reveal a substantial difference between the spending
categories. In terms of the civilian labor force, non-defense
expenditures create 65 percent more jobs for welfare than defense spend-
ing and spending in health and welfare creates 220 percent more jobs
than defense (Table 1). This analysis suggests that the more that is
spent on health and welfare the more jobs that are likely to be created
for recipients of those health and welfare services. This finding is
consistent with the theory that a segmented economy exists and that
direct spending- through health and welfare payments to those segments
likely to stimulate that sector in terms of employment opportunities.
Table 1
Employment Estimates for Welfare Recipients Who Had
Employment Experience in 1974-1975 by Category of
Spending of a Billion Dollars
Total ,
Welfare Employment
Defense 332
Non-Defense 547
Education 731
Health and Welfare 1,063
Individual Tax Credit 734
Investment Tax Credit 555
Public Sector 470
Private Sector 721
* Based on occupation
Another important point to be noted from this analysis is that tax
expenditures to individuals for personal consumption through something
such as income tax credit has a 32 percent greater impact on welfare
than tax expenditures for corporate investment. The difference is
probably much greater than this because (1) individuals tend to utilize
an income tax credit in greater percentages than corporations claim
investment tax credits, (2) individuals are more likely to spend the
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Co
money than corporations who may retain or save the money for a period
of time, and (3) individual spending tends to occur faster than cor-
porate spending which is more planned.
IV. Conclusion
This paper represents only an initial step in the attempt to apply
a segmented labor market analysis to the federal budget. More sophis-
ticated measures and estimates are needed and are possible. This type
of research will not only provide us with greater understanding of the
operation of our social economic system and the relationships between
welfare and the economy but will also assist in the development of
governmental policy as specific types of employment impacts are
identified and assessed.
As national economic policy becomes a greater influence over the
size and composition of the federal budget, it is now feasible to
examine the welfare-employment aspects of spending mixes. This will
emerge as increasingly important as the concern for welfare expendi-
tures continues and employment for welfare recipients is sought as
part of welfare reform efforts.
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